related party transactions – Jurnal Pengurusan /jurnalpengurusan Wed, 12 Oct 2022 05:27:16 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.9.1 Controlling Shareholders’ Networks and Related Party Transactions: Moderating Role of Director Remuneration in Malaysia /jurnalpengurusan/article/controlling-shareholders-networks-and-related-party-transactions-moderating-role-of-director-remuneration-in-malaysia/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=controlling-shareholders-networks-and-related-party-transactions-moderating-role-of-director-remuneration-in-malaysia Wed, 12 Oct 2022 05:27:16 +0000 /jurnalpengurusan/?post_type=article&p=5859 Past research argued that controlling shareholders can use their power of control to influence their networks via proxy (CSProxy) and multiple-directorship (CSMulti) to engage in related party transactions (RPT). Thus, we examine the associations between CSProxy and CSMulti, and RPTs. Additionally, directors are rewarded with remunerations, and therefore, director remuneration may be effective in minimizing agency conflict. Thus, we examine the impact of director remuneration as a moderator of the relationships between CSProxy and CSMulti, and RPT. The hypotheses are tested using a sample that consists of 622 listed companies in Malaysia over the period 2012-2014 with a total of 1,866 observations. CSProxy and CSMulti are found to have positive associations with RPTs. We also find that director remuneration is significant in moderating the CSProxy and CSMulti, and RPT relationships. This evidence suggests that director remuneration is an effective monitoring cost to minimize the abuse of RPTs by opportunistic controlling shareholders via their networking, CSProxy and CSMulti. It raises the concerns of the regulators and policy makers that controlling shareholders may utilize their posts, power, position and networks to opportunistically expropriate firm resources. Firm’s remuneration committee has to understand the importance of determining attractive remuneration that fulfils directors’ expectation and satisfaction.

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The Moderating Effects of Independent Directors’ Human Capital on the Relationship between Related Party Transactions and Firm Performance: Evidence from Malaysia /jurnalpengurusan/article/the-moderating-effects-of-independent-directors-human-capital-on-the-relationship-between-related-party-transactions-and-firm-performance-evidence-from-malaysia/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=the-moderating-effects-of-independent-directors-human-capital-on-the-relationship-between-related-party-transactions-and-firm-performance-evidence-from-malaysia Sat, 08 Oct 2022 11:44:14 +0000 /jurnalpengurusan/?post_type=article&p=2568 The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of related party transactions (RPTs) on firm performance and whether this effect is moderated by independent directors’ (INEDs) presence and their human capital (i.e. functional and firmspecific knowledge). Based on a sample of 300 non-financial firms listed on Bursa Malaysia for 2013, this study found that RPTs in general, have a positive effect on firm performance and this effect varies according to the parties involved in RPTs. Specifically, this study found that firm performance is higher for RPTs involving subsidiaries, associates and joint ventures. The findings support the efficient transactions hypothesis that RPTs can create value to the firm. INEDs’ presence and INEDs’ functional and firm-specific knowledge are found not to have any moderating effects on the RPTsfirm performance relationship. Therefore, the agency, resource dependence and human capital theories that stress on the importance of INEDs as corporate monitor and advisor are not supported. This study, perhaps the first, explains the interaction effects of INEDs’ functional and firm-specific knowledge on RPTs-firm performance relationship.

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Do Managers Reappoint Auditor for Related Party Transactions? Evidence from Selected East Asian Countries /jurnalpengurusan/article/do-managers-reappoint-auditor-for-related-party-transactions-evidence-from-selected-east-asian-countries/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=do-managers-reappoint-auditor-for-related-party-transactions-evidence-from-selected-east-asian-countries Sat, 08 Oct 2022 10:06:23 +0000 /jurnalpengurusan/?post_type=article&p=2426 We study the association between auditor reappointment (initial relationship stage), including recurring auditor appointment over several consecutive years (close relationship stage) and company engagement in related-party transactions (RPTs) for selected listed companies from Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. The results show that auditor reappointment has significant and negative associations with company engagement in RPTs. By contrast, the close ACR relationship increases company engagement in RPTs. The evidence also suggests that Big 4 audit firms can reduce company engagement in RPTs, even when they have a close relationship. However, the findings derived from a sub-sample of RPT companies suggest that the close relationship between Big 4 audit firms and their clients substantially encourages companies to engage in RPTs. Overall, these findings are consistent with theories in which higher audit quality is effective at monitoring RPTs, but the established relationship looks likely to create conflicting opinions that impair auditors’ independent judgment. Nevertheless, the likelihood of conflict disappears when clients operate in countries that more effectively implement and enforce regulations and protect minority shareholders

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Development of Tunneling Detection Model: A New Corporate Performance Improvement /jurnalpengurusan/article/development-of-tunneling-detection-model-a-new-corporate-performance-improvement/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=development-of-tunneling-detection-model-a-new-corporate-performance-improvement Sat, 08 Oct 2022 09:56:54 +0000 /jurnalpengurusan/?post_type=article&p=2411 Tunneling through related party transactions is one of the most challenging aspects in corporate governance. In addition, the impact of tunneling activities may affect to corporate governance’s performance in most of Asian countries. Yet, studies on the effectiveness of corporate governance in relation to tunneling are still limited and the results have been inconclusive. This study tries to develop a detection model to distinguish related party transactions that can be categorised as tunneling activities. Furthermore, this study also examines whether corporate governance mechanisms can explain the tunneling activities. The main findings of this study suggest that companies, in Indonesian listed companies, with concentrated ownerships have a greater tendency to conduct tunneling transactions compared to companies with dispersed ownerships, and the overall corporate governance mechanisms implemented by the companies could not be used as predictors for tunneling behaviour.

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